While advertising activities are primarily directed toward
the purchasers in a market, it also stands to reason that it has an indirect
effect on the financial markets: the
belief that a company will be successful in growing its market share through
advertising leads to an expectation of greater revenue and better financial
performance of the company as a whole, which makes its stock and other
investment vehicles more appealing to investors.
However, this is not as straightforward as it seems: investors take different perspectives as to
their preference for short-term versus long-term profitability of their
investments. The long-term investor is
more concerned with slow and sustainable growth, whereas the short-term
investor wants as much of a return as soon as possible and shows little concern
for the long-term sustainability of the firm.
The effect of investor confidence is likewise not solely to
be considered in terms of new investors purchasing into a company, but of
existing investors selling out. Where
any action on the part of the firm signals the potential for short-term profit
but long-term damage, institutional investors dump their holdings on the hordes
of eager short-term investors.
Likewise, when an action serves the long-term benefit of a firm at the
sacrifice of short-term profits, the short-term investor leave the firm and
unload their holdings on those with a greater long-term interest.
This problem is complicated by the traditional approach to
ownership, in which the investors maintain complete control over the firm and
place their interests before those of all other stakeholders. Since management is beholden to investors,
it is essentially helpless to object to the agenda of those investors. Where investors wish the firm to achieve
short-term returns while sacrificing the long-term sustainability, management
must yield to this directive (or be replaced by more amenable managers if they
resist).
While it is believed that the articles of incorporation provide
protection against the firm’s being raided by investors with a short-term
agenda, this protection is entirely superficial, given that the investors can
simply change the articles to favor their agenda. There is no contract or manifesto that is
ironclad, as history has shown.